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The text, of an essayistic nature, investigates the reasons for the body’s denial or silence 
in ethics, contextualizing the problem within the Platonic, Cartesian, and Christian 
tradition and its interpretation of the human being and body-soul double, which 
prioritizes consciousness of itself and reaffirms ethics rational foundation. From the 
twentieth century, under the inflow of the philosophical trends of aspiration to life, there 
begins the revision of the understanding of the body. Then, Shusterman’s thesis that the 
body’s rejection in ethics is due to its strong fundamental ambiguity is presented and the 
different expressions of this ambiguity inscribed in the how the body experiences them 
are analyzed. A unified view of body and mind, as proposed by Espinosa and Damasio, 
recognizes that consciousness and emotion are not separated and that a consideration 
of the body is decisive in the care for oneself and in the attention to others. Lastly, it is 
argued that esthetics can operate in favor of the corporeal in ethics, especially for ethics 
in education, through the work of emotions and feelings, as ethical decisions consistently 
evoke experiences that are intellectual, but also emotional, whose basis is corporeal. 
Literature, because of the esthetic experience it arises, presents special conditions to 
narrate the complexity involved in the ethical life and to work emotions and feelings, as 
observed in Hermann Broch’s The death of Virgil. 
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Folly, sin, deception, avarice
Occupy our spirit  and labor our body [...].
Charles Baudelaire
Was it his own body what the poet still felt?
Or was it naught but the reflection of his organism
or even a reflection of his own feeling?
Hermann Broch
Weight of tradition and subtle displacements
This text springs from the fundamental intuition according to which it is necessary 
to journey into a resumption of ethics that considers corporeity. After all, the body 
remains an obscure philosophical question, still awaiting clarification, a fact even more 
evident for the philosophy of education. This is not a matter of proposing a descriptive 
or phenomenological analysis of the body by itself, but a matter of highlighting the bond 
with the activity of thinking, with emotions and affections and clarifying how these issues 
mean an ethical life and human formation. More precisely, it is a matter of investigating 
why up to now this topic has been insistently denied, disregarded, or silenced.
The theme of corporeity in ethic debate lies on a secondary level, many times 
even non-existent, and that has been its path in the western thought, because the ethic 
foundation has been limited to the intellect, at the metaphysical-based thought’s will. 
Although ethics lies within the scope of practical reasoning, the moral acting was uprooted 
from the corporeal dimension and exclusively defined by metaphysical considerations, as 
a mental operation. The place of superficiality was assigned to the body, much to the taste 
of the dichotomies that presuppose the opposition between depth and surface, body and 
soul. The supremacy of such dualism, which privileged the soul over the body, granted 
it only a peripheral condition, as something to be dominated3, as observed in the field 
of education, in which repression was intense. In Plato and Descartes, one can find the 
foundational texts of this dichotomy. In Timaeus, the soul owns and governs the body 
(PLATÓN, 1986, v. I, p. 178, 34c). Plato also recommends that the soul be purified from the 
“folly of the body” (PLATÓN, 1986, v. III, p. 45, 67a) by rational self-control. The influence 
of the Christian religion4 - all evil would be in the flesh - paved the way in which ethics 
was substantially constituted by the dominion of the body, that is, by the dominion of 
passions. It is not a matter of denying the importance of a certain rational balance in 
the control of passions, but of denying the body due recognition. In the dawn of modern 
times, the Cartesian formula “I think, therefore I am” endorsed the security of awareness 
of oneself, independent of the body. The division between res cogitans and res extensa 
deepens the view of the deceptive senses and the cogito offers safety. That is what favored 
3- According to Shusterman, the body was not emphatically ignored, but it had a somewhat negative presence in philosophy, which, persistently 
privileges the mind and spirit. “Its dominantly  negative image - as a prison, distraction,  source of error and corruption - is both  reflected and 
reinforced by the idealistic bias and  disregard for somatic cultivation that Western philosophers generally display ”. (SHUSTERMAN, 2008, p. IX).
4- One can refer here to the well-known biblical passage, in which Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 7, says: “For I know that good does 
not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh” (The Bible, 1995 , p. 1390). 
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the shift of interests to the life of the spirit and to a strictly rational ethic foundation, 
leaving out of protagonism everything that refers to the sensible.
Only when language frees itself from its metaphysical bonds in search of a vital 
force do we find sporadic references to the value of the corporeal, as in Augustine (1973), 
who highlighted the power of the body when defining memory as “the womb of the soul” 
(AUGUSTINE, 1973, p. 205). The strength of this metaphor consists precisely of reuniting 
the body to the spirit, contrary to the usual disregard for the body, so common in medieval 
times. The metaphor points out that our memories, regardless of their psychic nature, bear 
bodily marks and, most likely, these tracks interfere with ethical decisions.
From the nineteenth century, under the inflow of philosophical trends of aspiration 
to life, the revision of the understanding of the body begins. Nietzsche led the way with 
his insistence on the radically corporeal dimension of functions related to consciousness 
and thought. At all times, he says, “I wrote my works with my whole body and my whole 
life: I don’t know what ‘purely spiritual’ problems” are (NIETZSCHE, 1988, v.9, p.170). 
In Ecce homo, when commenting on the creation of Thus spoke Zarathustra, he clearly 
shows that subjectivity is not cogito, but an achievement made from the body, which leads 
him to celebrate how much the body disposition is associated with intellectual creation:
[...] the muscular agility was always maximal in me, when the creative force flowed more 
vigorously. The body is enthused: we leave the “soul” out ... They could often see me dancing; I 
could, without a hint of fatigue, walk for seven to eight hours through the mountains. I would 
sleep a lot - I had perfect strength and patience. (NIETZSCHE, 1988, v.6, p. 341).
The question asked by some critics (SHUSTERMAN, 2004, p. 154) is whether 
Nietzsche wouldn’t only be reversing the trajectory of the Platonic, Christian, and 
Cartesian body-soul dualism by shifting the position of this double, in which the mind 
would become a mere instrument of the body. I believe that a closer look recognizes 
that the strength of the Nietzschean criticism does not lie in a mere displacement of the 
role of the body, but would be in the unveiling of the consequences of the control of 
passions that, without considering the constitutive dimension of the corporeal, leads the 
subject to disaggregation, to décadence. Subjectivity is not constituted only by reason or 
conscience. Rather, both the self and the thought result from a correlation of forces “of all 
the drives that constitute us” (NIETZSCHE, 1988, v. 12, p. 26), so that consciousness itself 
is conducted by the body, which it is not limited to being the seat of passions as tradition 
has assumed. By valuing it, Nietzsche does not leave the poles of the body-soul inversion 
intact, but redefines the body, demonstrating its infinitely complex possibilities, since it 
is “the richest, the clearest and the most palpable” of the phenomena (NIETZSCHE , 1988, 
v. 12, p. 205). It also opens the way for the soul, because “it is absolutely not necessary to 
even untangle from the soul”, but to open up “to new conceptions and refinements of the 
hypothesis of the soul” (NIETZSCHE, 1988, v. 5, p. 27).
Still in the context of this brief contextualization, it should be noted that the poets’ 
sensitivity can break a certain conceptual rigidity and anticipate truths that sciences will 
later prove. This is the case of Jorge Luis Borges when he delimits the unity between 
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body and soul, expressed in feeling, long before neuroscience. He reports “the real thrill” 
he felt when he first heard Keats’ verses, still in his childhood, when he discovered that 
language “was not only a means of communication, but could also be a passion and a 
pleasure”. When that was revealed to him, he says, “I felt that something was happening to 
me. It happened not with my simple intellect, but with my whole being, my flesh and my 
blood” (BORGES, 2000, p. 14). Borges unequivocally demonstrates that even the noblest 
activities of thought are felt bodily. This incarnated emotion, rooted in the corporeal, 
is often strange in the analysis of moral action. In the tradition of ethical thinking, our 
decisions, judgments, and choices are based on thinking and on what we conventionally 
call cognitive operations, drawn into the realm of consciousness, without considering that 
feelings and emotions are the foundation of reflected life.
Inattention to the body, however, should cause strangeness, given its determining 
character for our action, perception and thinking; after all, no one ignores the importance 
of the body in physical health and well-being5, as we read in Juvenal’s well-publicized 
Satire X (356): Mens sana in corpore sano. Despite the persistence of this verse in western 
memory and the recognized lunge of ancient thought in somatic practices, the weight 
of the metaphysical tradition eclipses our gaze, diverting attention. In fact, as Murdoch 
reminds us (2013, p. 55), attention in all morals consists of the effort to combat states of 
illusion. Not only the illusions with language, intentions, and decisions, but also, I would 
add, the lack of attention to the body, disguised in the repressive illusion of ideal bodies 
so much to the taste of fashion.
The contemporary valorization of sculpted and beautiful bodies still follows obscure 
tributary paths of the body-soul division, which deserved a vigorous criticism by Adorno 
and Horkheimer, in the Dialectic of enlightenment. They attribute to the body the double 
feeling of love and hate, seeing it “as something inferior and enslaved and, at the same time, 
desired as the forbidden, reified and alienated. [...] It is no longer possible to reconvert the 
physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib)” (ADORNO; HORKHEIMER, 1998, p. 266). 
Thus, the body-soul division leads to an objectification of the body, to an attention that 
does not constitute true care, which is alienated, because it is based on a mechanical body.
What the path of ethics studies suggests as a first approach to the corporeal refers to 
the role of moral feelings as opposed to the thesis that reason would be enough to explain 
morality, as observed in Hume6. The author proposes a naturalistic basis for ethics, in 
which human action is aroused by desire followed by bodily movement. Moral distinctions 
are practical in nature, they command our actions. Hume’s ethical treatment involves 
only “a spontaneous feeling about the motives (of the action), not a trained sensitivity” 
(SCHNEEWIND, 2001, p. 396). This tradition considers the psychological dimension of the 
5- According to Damasio, “when the body works without difficulty and when the transformation and the use of energy unfold with the will, the 
body behaves with a defined style. Approaching others is made easier. There is a relaxation and openness of the body, as well as expressions that 
translate confidence and well-being; on the other hand, certain classes of molecules are released, such as endorphins. The set of these reactions 
and the chemical signs associated with them result in the experience of pleasure” (DAMASIO, 2012, p. 47).
6- Hume’s thought is, according to Alberto Saoner’s interpretation, linked to a fundamental historical fact in the genesis of modern ethical 
thought, that is, “the rupture that occurs, as a result of  Renaissance innovation, of the impact of Protestantism and capitalism, between ‘virtue’ 
and ‘happiness’. This fracture forced a redefinition of moral terms, which forced them to seek a foundation for happiness not on socio-community 
bases, but on individual psychology” (SAONAR, 1999, p. 290).
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ethical subject, without corporeality being the object of analysis and the emphasis on the 
role of feelings in morals – a fundamental contribution - ends up being minimized by the 
overvaluation of reason that continues with moralistic metaphysicians.
The most influential theories on ethics in the contemporary debate remain, in general, 
linked to the view of duality between body and mind, still not exploring the possibilities 
of a view of unity, as proposed by Espinosa7 and by the studies of neuroscience (Damasio), 
what favors the idea of knowing passions to dominate them and not to integrate them in 
harmony. Here it is worth mentioning the coincidences of some conclusions between the 
philosopher’s and neuroscientist’s thinking, in the perspective of stressing that, if body and 
mind constitute a unit, ethics must consider the body’s affections. Espinosa and Damasio 
recognize that there is continuity between the body and the mental representations of 
what happens with the body, what allows the mind to act on it. That is, knowing our 
affectivity (emotions and feelings) to work on passions, not to try to eliminate them, but 
to avoid their obsessive effects on us. Espinosa uses the term affection (affectum) - which 
includes emotions and feelings - to refer:
[...] the affections (affectiones) of the body, by which the power of acting of this body is increased 
or decreased, favored or hindered, as well as the ideas of these affections. When, therefore, we are 
able to be the adequate cause of one of these affections, by affection I mean an action; in other 
cases, a passion. (SPINOZA, Ethics III, Def. III).
That is why Espinosa will insist on our capacity to break free from the tyranny of 
negative emotions. The point is that affections can act better on us, to overcome the force 
of passion.
For Damasio, emotions “are actions or movements, many of them public, that occur 
on the face, in the voice, or in specific behaviors”. (DAMASIO, 2012, P. 42). The feelings:
[...] on the contrary, they are necessarily invisible to the public, as is the case with all mental 
images, hidden from anyone, except from their rightful owner, the most private property of the 
organism in whose brain they occur. (DAMASIO, 2012, p. 42).
The scientist offers as an example of feeling the moment when we feel pleasure 
in the body, on a beach, in a state of well-being, with relaxed musculature, without 
tension and the countless thoughts that come to mind, creating feelings of pleasure. 
There is a harmony between body and mind that denies the attempt to understand them 
separately. What actually happens is “the feeling of a perception of a certain state of 
the body, together with the perception of thoughts with certain themes and with the 
perception of a certain way of thinking” (DAMASIO, 2012, p. 98). For both Damasio and 
Espinosa, the events of the body are represented as ideas in the mind. Thus, the basis 
of any consciousness and feeling is in our body. Influenced by Espinosa and based on 
his experimental research, Damasio considers that life should include “means to resist 
7- Espinosa interprets body and soul (or body and mind) as a unit and projects an ethic of affectivity, which takes into account the affections of 
the body. See the article The link between body, ethics and esthetics (HERMANN, 2018).
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the anguish caused by suffering and death, means to suppress sadness and to replace it 
with joy” (DAMASIO, 2012, p. 289). More than 300 years later, neurobiology reaffirms 
Espinosa’s thinking that the emotion of happiness increases the potency of acting. It is 
a conclusion that can bring profound changes in the lives of those who take it seriously.
Contemporarily, with a unified view of body and mind as a reference, Richard 
Shusterman articulates pragmatist philosophy with esthetics, with a view to giving due 
attention to the meaning of the corporeal in our life. Far from a naive defense of the 
corporeal, his investigative work is supported by consistent studies on the rediscovery of 
the body, from the nineteenth century, made by Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Simone de Beauvoir, Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James, and John Dewey, developing 
a rigorous assessment of these theories and their practical implications. He combines 
pragmatic philosophical studies with his therapeutic practice with the Feldenkrais method 
and the Alexander technique to promote a critical somatic awareness that favors knowledge 
of the self, of feelings, and of somatic behaviors. With a view to building bodily forms of 
subjectivity, Shusterman analyzes the competencies of perception and performance that 
can improve cognition and the capacity for virtues. He creates a disciplinary framework 
called somaesthetics, a field that:
[...] concerns  the body as a locus of sensory-esthetic appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-
fashioning. As an ameliorative  discipline of both theory and practice, it aims to enrich not 
only our abstract, discursive knowledge of the body, but also our lived somatic experience and 
performance; it seeks to enhance the understanding, efficaccy, and beauty of our movements. [...] 
Somaesthetics therefore involves a wide range of knowledge forms and disciplines  that structure 
such somatic care or that can improve it. (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b , p. 27).
In the work Body consciouness8, Shusterman points out that the term soma of 
somaesthetics “indicates a living, feeling  and sentient rather than a mere physical body 
that could be devoid of life and sensation” (SHUSTERMAN, 2008, p. 1), and the esthetics 
term refers to:
[...] soma’s perceptual role (whose embodied intentionality contradicts the body/mind dichotomy) 
and its aesthetic uses both in stylizing one’s self and appreciating of aesthetic qualities of other 
selves and things. (SHUSTERMAN, 2008, p. 1-2).
His theory recognizes that body, mind, and culture are interdependent, so that 
mental life cannot be separated from bodily processes, nor can it be so reduced. Despite 
the importance of the analytical studies of somaesthetics (whether genealogical or 
ontological), which describe the nature of cultural perceptions and practices and the 
emergence of different doctrines on corporeal practices, as Foucault does, Shusterman 
defends the pragmatic somaesthetics that proposes somatic improvement, which will 
result in benefit to one’s mental life. According to Shusterman (2012b, p. 27):
8- In the Brazilian translation: SHUSTERMAN, Consciência corporal, 2012a.
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We think and feel with our bodies, especially with the body parts that constitute the brain and 
nervous system. Our bodies are likewise affected by mental life, as when certain thoughts bring 
a blush to the cheek and change our heart rate and our breathing rhythms. The body-mind 
connection is so pervasively intimate that it seems misleading to speak of body and mind as two 
different, independent entities.
This intimate connection indicates that considerations of this order should take 
on a greater impetus for ethical theories. If ethics seeks to answer questions about how 
to live and, above all, encourages the improvement of our behavior, then we must have 
somatic knowledge that can broaden our understanding of ourselves and how emotions 
and affections act to make us more capable of making an art of living out of life 
(SHUSTERMAN, 2008). This leads us to recognize the importance of a dialogue between 
science and philosophy, because “science can instruct morality in certain points and can 
change its direction, but it cannot contain morality nor, therefore, moral philosophy” 
(MURDOCH, 2013, p. 43). The integration between body and mind depends on an opening 
of ethics to other fields of knowledge, including neuroscience studies9.
The ambiguity of the body
Why then, has the body been silenced in ethics studies10? Shusterman develops 
the paradoxical thesis that the rejection of the body in the humanities - and I would add 
in ethics in particular - is due to the fact that it (the body) “powerfully expresses the 
fundamental ambiguity of the human being” and also for its character of “all-pervasive, 
indispensable instrumentality in our lives” (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 28). In search of a 
nobler and less vulnerable view, ethics studies tend to avoid the theme of the body as well 
as the somatic means that could help achieve moral and intellectual ends.
The first dimension of the body’s ambiguity is revealed in the dual subject and 
object status. Simultaneously I am a body (subject) and I have a body (object). When 
I touch or examine a part of the body that is injured, I am exploring my body as an 
object and it becomes “the transparent source of perception or action, not an object 
9-  On the path of studies about the body, neurosciences assume, contemporarily, an outstanding role, showing the biological bases of the 
thinking process, which leads many researchers to be concerned with interdisciplinary dialogue to broaden the range of understanding about 
corporeality in ethical life. It is worth remembering the statement by Catherine Malabou, that there could be a productive dialogue between 
neuroscience and philosophy, which benefits from new discoveries regarding the regenerative capacity of the brain, given its fantastic plasticity. 
According to the author: “Freud certainly would not have turned his back on his origin as a neurologist if he could have known this advance, he 
would not have inscribed psychoanalysis in the symbolic in detriment of the organic” (MALABOU, 2015). Damasio also argues that neurobiology can 
play an important role in the explanations of cultural structures, such as ethics, but it is necessary to “include ideas from anthropology, sociology, 
psychoanalysis, and evolutionary psychology, as well as data from proper studies on ethics, laws, and religion” (DAMASIO, 2012, p. 175).
1�- Shusterman points out that the predominance of  Platonism, strengthened by Cartesianism and idealism “has blinded us to a crucial  fact 
that was evident to much of ancient and non-Western thought: since we live, think, and act through our bodies, their study, care, and improvement 
should be at the core of philosophy, especially when philosophy is conceived (as it use to be) as a distinctive way of life, a critical and disciplined 
care of the self that involves self-knowledge  and self-cultivation” (SHUSTERMAN, 2008, p. 15 ). In this perspective, the philosopher criticizes the 
position of Pierre Hadot, who, despite valuing philosophy as a way of life, does it unilaterally, emphasizing only the mind. This criticism is extended 
to Martha Nussbaum, who maintains intellectual unilateralism, limiting philosophy to rational debate. He recognizes that Foucault has the merit of 
renewing the Greek’s ancient concept of philosophy, emphasizing its somatic and esthetic aspects.
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of awereness” (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 28). The body is something that I own and, 
simultaneously, something that I use, that I order to do what I want and, often, it doesn’t. 
Therefore, it is a source of disorder, distraction, and this leads to its depreciation, its 
reduction to a mere instrument.
The body’s ambiguity is also present in human existence through which we integrate 
the same species, but with individual differences. Philosophers attributed to language 
and rationality the categories that characterize the human species; however, corporeality 
is also an essential condition for humanity. The body gives us unity and differentiates 
us - due to physical structure, functional practice, and sociocultural interpretation - in 
different genders, races, ethnicities, and classes, in addition to our own condition as unique 
individuals (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 29). Unlike animals, we are not programmed and 
even “the precise makeup of an individual’s nervous system (her preferred repertoire of 
neural pathways) is partly a product of her individual experience and cultural conditions” 
(SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 29).
The body is constituted by social meanings and this becomes visible when we deal 
with racial prejudices that “are somatically marked in terms of  vague  uncomfortable 
feelings aroused by alien bodies” (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 29-30), being resistant to 
rational discourse, because they are below the conscious level. We even deny prejudices, 
because we do not understand that we feel them. In other words, their rooting is of a 
corporeal order11 and the attempt to control or eliminate them depends on “develop the 
somatic awareness to recognize them in ourselves” (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 30).
In the human condition, the ambivalence of the body also shows as power and 
frailty, excellence and shame, dignity and brutality, knowledge and ignorance. Humanity 
is invoked both to lead to “moral excellence and rationality that transcend mere animality” 
and to “describe and excuse our flaws, failures, and lapses” (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 30) 
that are found in many behaviors, revealing the frailties we have in common with the 
beasts. However, the body is also the seat of human dignity, as seen in works of art, which 
express its beauty, as in the demand for its integrity inscribed in human rights.
Faced with this context, Shusterman reaffirms that ethical concepts and norms 
depend on how the body experiences them and the ways in which others treat it, that is, 
people with hungry and abused bodies probably do not find value in concepts such as 
duty, charity, and respect for others. It is equally through bodily experience that many 
of our emotions take hold, such as disgust, which, subsequently, extends to cases of 
misogyny, anti-Semitism, and homophobia. That (disgust) is a visceral emotion, with 
strong physical reactions (vomit) in the face of stimuli such as odors and objects that seem 
disgusting to us. It is centered on the repulsion to incorporate an offensive object. It is 
related, therefore, to the limits of the body and what is foreign to us, especially the border 
11- Damásio mentions the importance of knowing the biology of emotions because it offers a new opportunity to understand modern behavior. 
Thus, racial prejudices are based “on social emotions whose evolutionary value dwelled in detecting differences in other individuals - because these 
differences indicated possible dangers - and in promoting aggression and withdrawal. Such reactions may have produced extremely useful results 
in a tribal society, but it is neither useful nor acceptable in the current world. It is evidently important to know that our brains are still equipped with 
biological machinery that leads us to react in an ancestral, ineffective, and unacceptable way in certain circumstances.” (DAMÁSIO, 2012, p. 54).
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with our animality, which is lived in a problematic way12 (NUSSBAUM, 2006, p. 106-110). 
The body points out our frailty in the face of what surpasses us.
In addition, Shusterman shows that the ambiguity of the body also appears in 
relation to the freedom evidenced in ethical choices, since we can only act through our 
bodily means. The freedom to move our own bodies is at the root of all of the most 
abstract notions of freedom. And, at the same time, true to its ambiguity:
[...] the body also clearly symbolizes our unfreedom: the bodily constraints on our actions, the 
corporeal bulk,  needs, and failures that weigh us down and limit our performance; the relentless 
degeneration of aging and death. (SHUSTERMAN, 2012b, p. 32).
Highlighting the meaning of the body for ethics does not mean stating that ethical 
considerations are restricted to it, but disregarding it is associated with a foundation 
regulated by infinitism, insofar as this principle does not recognize the limits, which 
the body insists on indicating. Infinitism seeks a “universal antidote to the lack, the 
transience, and the particularity, the three constituent elements of human finitude, all 
marked by pain” (LOPARIC, 1995, p. 9).
What Shusterman especially defends is the relevance of somatic practices (Yoga, 
Feldenkrais method, Alexander technique) which, when placing us face to face with painful 
bodily limitations, shows the mortality of the body and teaches the wisdom of humility. 
It is in this perspective that the neglect of the body by philosophy reveals a “proud and 
willful denial of our mortal limits”. Thus, refining body perception and performance should 
be crucial to the philosophical task of “working on oneself” (SHUSTERMAN, 2008, p. 123).
Esthetics and the work of emotions and feelings
I would like to add, in the course of argument, the way esthetics can operate in favor 
of the corporeal in ethics, through the work of emotions and feelings. This configures the 
formative sense that the body can take for an ethic in education, especially for the care 
of oneself, which helps us not remain strangers to ourselves, denying our ambiguity and 
frailty. More specifically, I am referring to the relevance of the esthetic experience, which, 
when making an agency of the senses produces new models and perceptions about its 
object, transforming it.
This experience mobilizes emotions, acting on our moral sensitivity in order to 
favor both self-knowledge and ethical virtues for the benefit of others. If, as Damásio 
(2000, p. 33) says, “conscience and emotion are not separable”, our mind, when making 
ethical decisions, consistently evokes emotional and intellectual experiences. We can only 
take more appropriate ethical action if our sensitivity perceives the context and beliefs 
involved in decisions.
12- See especially chapter II - La repugnância y nuestro corpo animal, in Nussbaum’s El ocultamiento del humano (2006), in which the 
philosopher makes an inventory of research in this area, drawing a broad picture developed by experimental sciences and psychoanalysis.
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Thus, the knowledge of the complexity of ethical action is activated by emotions 
and feelings - the basis of which is in the body - because such action does not occur just 
because we know an abstract principle or a norm of action. In this perspective, the depth of 
the literary work (and the esthetic experience it provokes) has special conditions to narrate 
the complexity involved in moral deliberation; “an adventure of personality”, which the 
literary narrative shows with all “terrifying expectations and among amazing mysteries” 
(NUSSBAUM, 1992, p. 142). This gives “beauty and wealth” to the narrated action that 
traditional philosophical texts cannot transmit, which coincides with Iris Murdoch’s 
observation, when recognizing that literature is “an education on how to imagine and 
understand human actions” (MURDOCH, 2013, p. 51). And, in a more radical step, the 
philosopher seeks to no longer contrast art and morals, since art is not just a playful 
activity, a “kind of by-product of our failure to be entirely rational”. On the contrary, 
“we must go back to what we know about grand art, the moral revelation it contains 
and the great moral realization it represents” (MURDOCH, 2013, p. 60). Art, continues the 
philosopher, “is the most educational of all human activities and a place where the nature 
of morality can be seen” (MURDOCH, 2013, p. 120).
What the esthetic experience promotes, in the case of novels, are emotional and 
intellectual reactions that start to interact with our beliefs and ideas, favoring new images 
of ourselves, the world, and how to operate with our passions and desires, in the face 
of ethical rules. If the body provokes ethics by facing our mortal limits, revealed by the 
suffering of pain and illness, the esthetic experience, which also originates in the senses, 
generates a variety of ideas as a result of the imagination that was activated and recreates 
the object that it is given to the subject, in a way that is not obtained by objective and 
intellectual knowledge.
This was the perspective that led Hermann Broch - one of the most important writers 
of the twentieth century - to dedicate himself to literature, in the search for a project to 
“pour all the esthetic into the power of the ethical” (BROCH, apud ARENDT, 2003, p. 103). 
He sought literature to deal with themes such as death and finitude, precisely because, 
according to him, philosophy fails to give validity to themes of this nature. In other words, 
certain themes reach us entirely through the senses, through esthetics.
The death of Virgil (1945), considered a masterpiece, narrates the last 18 hours of 
life of Virgil, the author of the Latin work Aeneid, since his arrival at the port of Brindisi 
(in Italy) coming from Athens, where he sought inspiration to conclude the Aeneid, until 
his death in the Palace of Emperor Augustus. The novel-poem - so it is considered - in 
“undulant lyrical rhythms”, as Arendt says, deals with the confrontation of the poet Virgil 
with death, with his life, and the life of his time, a world of “value disintegration”. Virgil 
fears that death will prevent him from completing his work, which he considers imperfect 
and incomplete and that is why he wants to burn it.
The novel shows, with great literary virtuosity, the death inscribed in the flesh, in 
the aging of the body and in the “mysterious way” that “we are tied to time, mysteriously 
it flows ... empty current ... superficial current and we ignore both its course and its depth 
... ”(BROCH, 1982, p. 364). The strength of the poetic narrative expands and intensifies 
the understanding of the human finitude, the human incoherencies, the desire for totality. 
To use one of Broch’s expressions, the novel rebuilds “existential layers” that reveal the 
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meaning of death, of pain, of human blindness. What Virgil seeks is the “knowledge of 
death” (BROCH, 1982, p. 334), the redemption of death.
At the end of the novel, there is a kind of revelation, an epiphany:
[...] Broch’s Virgil ends up understanding, by apprehending in an existential way, the fact that the 
essential, the revelation of death, lies precisely beyond the word. On the other hand, only action, 
and not words, can give death a human sense. (STEINER, 2001, p. 281).
The absolute of redemption is above the words of the poet, it is the ethical appeal, in 
the sense of providing assistance to others. In this way, the esthetic experience promoted 
by Broch’s work of absolute beauty, which transcends the limits of reality to touch the 
mystery of death, provokes in us the amplification of the somaestesthetic feeling of frailty, 
which was instituted by the limitations of the body (as mentioned above in this text), to 
reveal, in an intensity of feelings, the spiritual testimony that the fundamental value of 
life, in the face of all limitations, lies in the attempt to be virtuous. This shows the link 
between bodily emotions, feelings, esthetics, and the ethical, as well as the educating 
capacity of esthetic feelings.
Final considerations
In an attempt to make the relationship between ethics and the body less obscure, I 
initially sought to lay out the reasons that circumscribe the corporeal within the scope of 
metaphysical dichotomies, assigning it a peripheral place, something to be dominated and 
even denied or silenced. The origin of this interpretation, rooted in the Platonic, Cartesian, 
and Christian tradition, points to the primacy of the soul, self-awareness, and the rational 
foundation of ethics. As discussed throughout the text, the path traveled by the issue of the 
body in Western culture suffers profound oscillations, ranging from the approach made 
by Hume regarding moral feelings, through the contribution of Nietzsche, who highlights 
the radically corporeal dimension of the functions related to awareness and thinking. 
However, it is with Espinosa and, contemporarily, with the neuroscientist Damasio that 
the approach of unity between body and soul affirms the ethical behavior associated with 
body affections, breaking with the opposition body-soul or body-mind, to affirm the 
favorable position of continuity between the body and the mental representations of what 
happens with the body.
Shusterman’s pragmatic approach is situated in this broader movement of valuing 
the corporeal, added, however, to the originality that the somatic experience takes in 
the constitution of our being. His hypothesis for refusing to consider the body in ethics 
is due to the fact that the body expresses the fundamental ambiguity of the human 
being, revealed both in the power and in the frailty of bodily experiences, above all, 
the experience of pain and death. The ethical discussion tried to circumvent this frailty, 
silencing the corporeal dimension and ensuring the foundation on more solid bases, derived 
from rational activity. Shusterman defends improving awareness of bodily feelings and 
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actions to favor the knowledge of ourselves, since ethical principles and norms depend on 
how the body experiences them.
Lastly, I suggested the educational way in which esthetics can operate in favor of 
the corporeal in ethics, through the work of emotions and feelings, particularly in the 
example of Hermann Broch’s The Death of Virgil. The esthetic experience, promoted by 
novels, helps to understand the complexity of ethical decisions, which depend not only 
on the intellectual dimension, but also on emotional experiences, whose base is corporeal.
My intention was to break the silence of the relationship between body and ethics. 
Recognizing that the body is at the base of our emotions is a decisive step towards an 
ethic that does not intend to ignore our condition in the world. The mere intellectualistic 
knowledge of passions is not enough to overcome its strength, but rather the work on our 
emotions, from the recognition that the body acts on mental life.
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